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IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1945.

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No. 189  
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LAURENCE M. WILLIAMS, as Liquidator of STERLING SUGARS,  
INC., formerly a Louisiana Corporation, and, STERLING  
SUGARS SALES CORP., *Petitioners*,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, *Respondent*.

—  
**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE  
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AND BRIEF IN SUP-  
PORT THEREOF.**

✓  
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**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE  
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*To the Honorable the Chief Justice and the Associate Jus-  
tices of the Supreme Court of the United States:*

Your petitioners, Laurence M. Williams, is the Liquidator of Sterling Sugars, Inc., a Louisiana corporation, and Sterling Sugar Sales Corporation, is a Louisiana corporation. They respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the final judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the aforesaid cause. That Court's opinion was rendered on February 14, 1946, and a petition for rehearing was denied on March 15, 1946.

## **JURISDICTION.**

Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Supreme Court to review this cause by writ of certiorari by Section 240(a) of the Judicial Code as amended by the Act of February 13, 1935 (U. S. C. A., Title 28, Section 347), and by the Revenue Act of 1936, Title VII, Section 906(g) printed in the Appendix hereto.

## **SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MATTERS INVOLVED.**

Laurence M. Williams is the Liquidator of Sterling Sugars, Inc. and is herein for convenience called Williams. Sterling Sugars, Inc. was a grower and processor of sugarcane and a refiner of raw sugar and during the period from June 8, 1934, through October 31, 1935, paid processing taxes totaling \$652,424.05 under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as amended. Sterling Sugars Sales Corp. was selling agent for Sterling Sugars, Inc. Of this sum it is seeking to recover \$651,825.27. Several claims for refund of these taxes were filed pursuant to Title VII of the Revenue Act of 1936. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the final claim in full. Thereupon, Williams and the Sales Corporation filed petitions for a hearing on the merits with the United States Processing Tax Board of Review. That Board heard the cause but thereafter and before decision the cause was transferred to the Tax Court of the United States on December 31, 1942, as provided by statute (56 Stat. 957, 967).

The Tax Court made findings of fact of an unfavorable margin, a price increase on June 8, 1934, and some letters, etc., indicating that the taxpayer believed it had passed the tax on, or intended to do so. It appeared to be controlled by the finding that:

"The Processing Corporation, together with other producers of sugar, increased on this date its prices to customers by the amount of 55 cents per 100 pounds and the fluctuation of sugar prices on the market after that date was from the higher level." (R. 86, 87)

The remaining findings were directed towards the end of supporting the foregoing finding. The decision, adverse to the petitioner was rendered September 20, 1943 (R. 90).

Thereafter the petitioner filed a motion for amendment of the findings and reconsideration of the cause, directing the Court's attention to the fact that the margins had been erroneously computed and were in fact favorable to the petitioner, and, that there was a mass of evidence regarding price movements with respect to which the Court had made no findings; also, that the price rise of June 8, 1934<sup>4</sup> was not in fact a rise and that such rise was not maintained. (R. 91 to 130). The said motion was denied on October 25, 1943. (R. 131-132).

Twenty months later this Court in another sugar case, *Webre Steib Co. Ltd.*, (324 U. S. 164, 174), held that the very same price increase was not conclusive of a tax shift, indicating for the Tax Court's guidance on remand that it should consider how far the petitioner had succeeded in its effort to pass the tax on, and that the price may not have responded continuously to the effort to shift the tax. As a further guide of the type of evidence that will determine a tax shift this Court cited *Johnson, AAA Refunds: A Study in Tax Incidence* (1937) (37 Col. L. Rev. 910) (R. 344-356). The said cited authority holds that in considering a tax shift all the economic factors that affect price must be considered and weighed. The pertinent part of that article appears in the record (R. 344-356).

After this Court spoke in *Webre Steib Co. Ltd.* (supra) the Tax Court had occasion to meet the same fact in another Louisiana sugar case, *South Coast Corporation v. Com.* (T. C. Memo. Docket No. 2165, decided June 11, 1945), and, in deciding for the taxpayer in an opinion written by the same Judge (Leech) who wrote the opinion in the case at bar, referred to the same price increase and stated:

"It must be remembered that fluctuations in price of refined sugar are due to many causes other than tax imposition."

This Court, also held in *Webre Steib* (supra) that the margin could be rebutted pro tanto (324 U. S. 171); and, assuming the margin was adverse, the Tax Court failed to evaluate the margin rebuttal evidence.

It is obvious that the Court and particularly Judge Leech had changed his mind respecting the importance of the June 8, 1934 price rise, and that it did not stand alone but must be considered in the light of what causes price changes.

In the case at bar the Tax Court had evidence of the type advocated in the *Johnson* article, and in the motion to amend the findings the Court's attention was directed thereto; however, it thought them not controlling (R. 132). The taxpayer adduced, but the Court failed to make findings with respect to the following lines of evidence, to wit:

(a) That immediately preceding the price rise of June 8, 1934 the market declined the equivalent of the tax in an effort to get rid of sugar (R. 170-171).

(b) That there were no sales of sugar for some time after the price rise of June 8, 1934 (R. 178).

(c) That the petitioner does not initiate any sales prices. It sells at a set discount from the standard price of competitors (R. 158). It always followed the large refiners in price changes up or down (R. 159).

(d) After the invalidation of the tax the price of refined sugar was higher than when it was subject to a tax (R. 171).

(e) The taxpayer tried to do everything its competitors were doing and patterned itself after its competitors (R. 189).

(f) Evidence of the price changes and its causes were adduced beginning with early spring 1933 (R. 95-101).

(g) The Court found the Cost of Commodity for the margin computation to be \$3,963,006.03 for the tax period (R. 84) and \$7,156,004.66 for the base period (R. 84). A



composition of such figures (R. 102) clearly shows that the cost of commodity has not been computed as required by Section 907(b)(5) Revenue Act of 1936 (49 Stat. 1751).

(h) Seven factors other than the tax were advanced by the taxpayer in rebuttal of the margin (R. 112-121) but no findings were made with respect thereto.

In addition, the respondent, in fact the United States Government, through its Secretary of Agriculture on March 15, 1937 in a Press Release analyzing the effect of a tax on sugar stated:

"Thus it will be noted that the quantity of supply, and not the cost of production, is the direct causal factor in determining price; and factors other than cost of production—in this case quotas—can supersede cost of production in determining supply, and hence in determining price."

The foregoing evidence and the subsequent action of the Tax Court in *South Coast Corp. v. Com.* (supra) would appear to make it clear that the Tax Court decided the case at bar under a misconception of the law; and, that it would have decided the case at bar differently had this Court's decision in *Webre Steib Co. Ltd.* (supra) construing the law preceded rather than followed the decision in the instant case.

Your petitioner appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and that Court affirmed on the same group of facts deemed controlling by the Tax Court (R. 335-337); ignoring the rationale of this Court's construction in *Webre Steib* (supra).

We contend that the function of the Circuit Court was not to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the Tax Court. The function of the Circuit Court was to examine the findings of fact and decide whether or not the Tax Court had reached its conclusion by weighing the facts according to the rule of law laid down by this Court. Obviously it had not. Hence from petitioners' viewpoint these are the

## QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

1. Is the rule of law reestablished by this Court in *Dobson v. Com.* (320 U. S. 489)—whereby the function of the reviewing Court is limited to an ascertainment of whether there is a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the Tax Court and denying it the right to weigh all the evidence—applicable when this Court subsequent to the decision of the Tax Court construes the statute in a manner requiring the weighing of evidence more embracing than that weighed by the Tax Court in reaching its conclusion?

2. Where the Tax Court rests its decision on a single fact which it considers controlling and makes findings collateral to that fact—ignoring all the balance of the evidence—and then loses jurisdiction before this Court in another cause construes the applicable law in a manner requiring the weighing of the ignored evidence, will this Court grant certiorari to determine whether such decision is in accordance with law as this Court has subsequently construed the law?

3. Did the Tax Court err in finding that following the increase of 55 cents “the fluctuation of sugar prices on the market after that date was from the higher level thus set” (R. 87); when there is not a shred of evidence in support of such a finding?

4. Did the Tax Court err in failing to weigh the margin rebuttal evidence adduced by the taxpayer in order to determine the “actual extent” of the tax burden borne or shifted as required by Section 907(e) of the Revenue Act of 1936 (49 Stat. 1752)? This question is of particular importance due to the erroneous theory applied by the Tax Court in deciding the case.

## REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

### 1.

Only this Court, by granting the writ, can correct the gross miscarriage of justice that will otherwise result from

the Tax Court's erroneous construction of the law prior to this Court's decision in *Webre Steib Co. Ltd.* (supra). The evidence has been adduced, but the Tax Court ignored all of such evidence in deciding the case.

Unless certiorari is granted we have the anomalous situation of your petitioner being denied justice and its competitors *Webre Steib Co. Ltd.*, *South Coast Corp.*, and *Insular Sugar Refining Co.* (141 F. (2d) 713) being granted justice—even though the same single fact applies to all—simply because the Tax Court erroneously construed the law.

2.

The Circuit Court of Appeals, by applying the rule of law, reestablished by this Court in *Dobson v. Com.* (supra), instead of recognizing the exception resulting from an intervening decision by this Court, has perpetuated the error of the Tax Court, and this taxpayer cannot procure justice unless this Court grants certiorari and upon remand directs the lower Court to weigh all the evidence and findings of fact.

3.

Rule 38, paragraph (5)(b) of the rules of this Court sets forth as one of the reasons this Court in its exercise of sound judicial discretion, may grant certiorari is where a Circuit Court of Appeals has decided a federal question in a way probably in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court. We think that the Circuit Court by confining itself to the *Dobson* rule has decided the case at bar in conflict with the decision of this Court in *Webre Steib Co. Ltd.* insofar as that case decides the type of evidence to be weighed.

4.

Certiorari is being applied for in two other sugar cases, *Realty Operators, Inc.* and *William Henderson* (Partnership). All three cases were decided by the Tax Court on the same narrow fact before this Court decided *Webre*

*Steib*. All three cases were consolidated for argument before the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed all three cases without testing them by the rule laid down by this Court in *Webre Steib*. The granting of certiorari and subsequent remand is the only means by which a flagrant miscarriage of justice can be avoided.

## 5.

Counsel for your petitioners successfully represented *Webre Steib* before this Court; and represents *Realty Operators, Inc.* and *William Henderson* in the petitions they have filed this day. Counsel assures this Court that the evidence this Court believed lacking but necessary to a sound decision in *Webre Steib* is contained in the record in the instant cases in abundance; so that, if the Tax Court is given an opportunity to weigh such evidence we believe that the ends of justice will be served.

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---

**PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION  
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.**

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*To the Honorable the Chief Justice and the Associate Jus-  
tices of the Supreme Court of the United States:*

In applying for a writ of certiorari in this case and the companion cases filed this day we have a most unusual situation that only this Court can correct. The Tax Court decided these cases on the theory that the price rise in the sugar industry on the day the tax went into effect was conclusive in deciding the issue. The record discloses a substantial volume of evidence not bearing on the grounds ultimately relied on by that Court; but, nevertheless of sufficient scope so that the record shows the taxpayer adduced substantial evidence in conformity with this Court's hold-

ing of the type of evidence necessary to correctly decide the issue. True, the taxpayer has had its hearing on the merits, and the remand here sought is not for the purpose of retrying the case, the evidence has been adduced and the taxpayer is prepared—if need be—to rely upon the record made. The purpose of the writ is to permit the Tax Court to weigh all the evidence to the end and purpose that the test directed by this Court in *Webre Steib* (supra) may be applied.

This Court in deciding *Webre Steib* held that the price rise on June 8, 1934 was not conclusive; that the test was how far the taxpayer succeeded in its effort to pass the tax on; and, that the price may not have responded continuously to the effort to shift the tax (324 U. S. 174). As indication of the type of evidence needed this Court cited *Johnson's* article in the Columbia Law Review and we have reproduced in the record from that article the entire chapter dealing with price factors (R. 344-356).

By the time this Court decided *Webre Steib* the Tax Court had lost jurisdiction of the case because an appeal had been filed with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. No relief therefore was possible from the Tax Court, although that Court in a subsequent sugar case, in an opinion by the same Judge (Leech) who wrote the opinion in the case at bar attached little significance to the June 8, 1934 price rise stating:

“It must be remembered that fluctuations in price of refined sugar are due to many causes other than tax imposition.”

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case at bar and the companion cases filed this day in a consolidated argument, and we respectfully suggest that upon certiorari being granted one consolidated argument be held before this Court.

The Circuit Court's attention was directed to the decision of this Court in *Webre Steib* but it apparently was im-

pressed by the argument of the Government that under the theory of *Dobson v. Com.* (320 U. S. 489) its function on review was limited to ascertaining whether there was substantial evidence to support the Tax Court's conclusion. This is all that the Circuit Court did, affirming on the same group of facts deemed controlling by the Tax Court instead of testing the Tax Court's conclusion to determine whether it was in accordance with law—in accordance with law as this Court construed the law after the decision by the Tax Court.

We cannot agree that upon the rendering of a decision by this Court subsequent to a decision by the Tax Court that the Circuit Court is limited in its review. Instead we think it must test the record to determine whether the decision is in accordance with law—in accordance with the law as construed by this Court, not as the Tax Court thought it to be. Therefore, the

### **SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR TO BE URGED.**

are that the Circuit Court of Appeals erred:

1. In limiting its review to a determination of whether there was a substantial basis in the evidence for the conclusion reached by the tax Court. (R. 377)

2. In failing to review the findings of fact made by the Tax Court in order to determine whether the conclusion reached from all the evidence was in harmony with the principles pronounced by this Court in a later decision.

3. By failing to find as a matter of law that the decision of the Tax Court was not in accordance with law.

4. In failing to find that the Tax Court committed reversible error in holding that the price increase once made, a fortiori, "the fluctuation of sugar prices on the market after that date was from the highest level thus set" (R. 87); whereas, there is not a scintilla of evidence in support of such logic.

5. In failing to remand the cause to the Tax Court with instruction to determine the "actual extent" to which the seven factors other than the tax adduced by the taxpayer (R. 112), pro tanto rebutted the presumption resulting from the margin computation, as provided by Section 907(e) of the Revenue Act of 1936 (49 Stat. 1752) and construed by this Court in *Webre Steib* (324 U. S. 164, 171).

6. In failing to remand the cause to the Tax Court with instructions to determine the margin presumption by determining the Cost of Commodity in accordance with Section 907(b)(5) of the Revenue Act of 1936 (49 Stat. 1751).

### **ARGUMENT.**

#### **Scope of Review.**

This Court in *Dobson v. Com.* (320 U. S. 489, 501) had occasion to remind the Courts that the function of a reviewing Court in tax cases coming up from the Tax Court was, under the law, limited to ascertaining whether there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions reached by that Court, but was careful to qualify that rule of law to the extent that the decision must have warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in the law. In *Webre Steib* (supra) this Court said: (324 U. S. 173)

"We must determine whether there is evidence which is legally sufficient for administrative action, but we may not weigh it."

and in *Com. v. Scottish American Inv. Co.* (323 U. S. 119, 124) this Court said:

"The judicial eye must not in the first instance rove about searching for evidence to support other conflicting inferences and conclusions which the judges or the litigants may consider more reasonable or desirable. It must be cast directly and primarily upon the evidence in support of those made by the Tax Court."



We consider that good law—in any event, it is the law of the land—but we cannot lose sight of the fact that the decision of the Tax Court must be in accordance with law. Under circumstances such as those here present—that is when the Tax Court construes a law with no other guide than its own interpretation, and this Court subsequently construes the law in a manner that is clearly at variance with the construction of the Tax Court—then, it is the function of the reviewing Court to examine all the evidence and determine whether the construction of the Tax Court is according to law, as such law is construed by this Court.

That the Circuit Court did not do. The Tax Court's original interpretation is not reconcilable with the law as laid down by this Court. This is evident from the fact that the Tax Court treated the same piece of evidence differently in *South Coast Corp. v. Com.* (T. C. Memo. Docket No. 2165, decided June 11, 1945) after it had the benefit of a construction by this Court in *Webre Steib* (supra).

Despite the limitations placed upon the Circuit Courts if the decision of the Tax Court is in accordance with law, no such limitation applies if the decision is not in accordance with law. Where, as here, the decision is clearly not in accordance with law as this Court has construed the law, the Circuit Court should have remanded the case for a weighing of the evidence in the light of the law as it was determined by this Court.

Since the Circuit Court did not perform its proper function, your petitioner must rely upon the grace of this Court to remedy a wrong that otherwise will be beyond correction.

### **The Decision is Not in Accordance with Law.**

Prior to the decision of this Court in *Webre Steib* (supra) there was no guidepost for the Tax Court to follow other than its own construction of what evidence would demonstrate where the burden of the tax fell.

In *Webre Steib* this Court made it clear that the intention of the taxpayer was not controlling, nor was his belief

that he had accomplished a shift. The test is, was a shift accomplished. Failure of success in the effort to shift the tax was important; likewise, the price may not have responded continuously to the effort to shift the tax (324 U. S. 174). *Johnson's* article in the *Columbia Law Review* (R. 344-356) was cited as the kind of evidence that would demonstrate where the burden of the tax fell.

*Johnson* in his article develops the full economics of what causes price changes—competition, marginal producers, elasticity of demand, etc. He begins Chapter IV (R. 344) with the statement that:

“A tax on group production or on gross sales is shifted by the taxpayer to the extent that *the tax causes the price of the product to be increased and the costs of production to be decreased*. Since, then, tax incidence is a problem of price analysis, it can be explained only in terms of the factors which determine price.” (Italics supplied)

The Secretary of Agriculture in advocating the reimposition of the tax in a Press Release dated March 15, 1937, likewise approaches the problem of tax impact by an analysis of price factors and in substantiation of his conclusions makes the following observation:

“Perhaps it should be noted that although there was a tax of one-half cent per pound of sugar during 1935 and no tax during 1936 the difference in the price paid by consumers in the two years was only one-tenth cent.”

The Secretary further finds that:

“Thus it will be noted that the quantity of supply, and not the cost of production, is the direct causal factor in determining price; and factors other than cost of production—in this case *quotas*—*can supersede* cost of production in determining supply, *and hence in determining price*.” (Italics supplied)

Surely, a decision based on such false logic—that once a price rise takes place “the fluctuations of sugar prices

on the market after that date was from the higher level thus set" (R. 87)—cannot be in accordance with law. Lacking a single shred of evidence to support such a conclusion cannot be in accordance with law. The same Tax Court Judge changed his mind about the conclusiveness of the June 8, 1934, price rise and the implications that follow—after this Court pointed the way—in *South Coast Corp. v. Com.* (supra). However, there is but one way in which the injustice in the case at bar can be corrected and that is for this Court to grant certiorari. Obviously a federal question has been decided in a way probably in conflict with an applicable decision of this Court (Rule 38 (5) (b)).

#### **Actual Extent of the Burden of the Tax Borne.**

The decision of the Tax Court, affirmed by the Circuit Court on the same grounds, rested on the price rise of June 8, 1934, and the unwarranted logic that subsequent fluctuations were from the higher level thus set. Both the major and minor premise have been demonstrated to be wrong. Consequently it leaves the record in a position where the Court has found an unfavorable margin—although the margin is in fact favorable—and has failed to evaluate the rebuttal evidence adduced by the taxpayer (R. 112), nor has the Court made findings of the factors that in fact caused price changes.

The factors causing price changes affect the industry and all in it alike. In *Realty Operators, Inc.* (certiorari application filed this day) the Court made voluminous findings with regard to the factors that caused price changes. In *William Henderson* (certiorari application filed this day) it was stipulated that the quota system directly affected the price of the raw sugar. It is therefore evident upon remand the Tax Court can from the record and its conclusions in the companion cases do justice—justice as it has administered it in a subsequent case, *South Coast Corp.* (supra) after this Court showed the way in *Webre Steib* (supra).

**Conclusion.**

For the reasons stated in the foregoing petition and supporting brief, it is respectfully submitted that this petition for writ of certiorari be granted.

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## APPENDIX.

Sec. 906 (g) Rev. Act of 1936 as amended (56 Stat. 969)

Section 510 (j) of Revenue Act of 1942: (56 Stat. 969)

• • • • •  
(j) Section 906 (g) (relating to appeals) is amended to read as follows:

“(g) A decision of the Board rendered after January 1, 1942, may be reviewed by a circuit court of appeals or the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, if a petition for such review is filed by either the claimant or the Commissioner within three months after the decision is rendered. Such decision may be reviewed by the circuit court of appeals for the circuit in which the claimant resides, or has his principal place of business, or, if none, by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: *Provided, however,* that in any event such decision may be reviewed by any circuit court of appeals or the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which may be designated by the Commissioner and the claimant by stipulation in writing. Such courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm the decision of the Board, or to modify or reverse such decision, if it is not in accordance with law, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing as justice may require. The judgments of such courts shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certification or certiorari as provided in sections 239 and 240 of the Judicial Code as amended. Such courts are authorized to adopt rules for the filing of petitions for review, preparation of the record for review, and the conduct of the proceedings on review. A decision of the Board rendered after January 1, 1943 shall become final in the same manner that decisions of the Board become final under section 1140 of the Internal Revenue Code.”

Sec. 907 (e) Rev. Act of 1936 (49 Stat. 1752).

(e) Either the claimant or the Commissioner may rebut the presumption established by subsection (a) of this section by proof of the actual extent to which the claimant shifted to others the burdens of the processing tax. Such proof may include, but shall not be limited to—

(1) Proof that the difference or lack of difference between the average margin for the tax period and the average margin for the period before and after the tax was due to changes in factors other than the tax. Such factors shall include any clearly shown change (A) in the type or grade of article or commodity, or (B) in costs of production. If the claimant asserts that the burden of the tax was borne by him and the burden of any other increased costs was shifted to others, the Commissioner shall determine, from the effective dates of the imposition or termination of the tax and the effective date of other changes in costs as compared with the date of the changes in margin (when margins are computed for weeks, months, or other intervals between July 1, 1931, and August, 1936, in the manner specified in subsection (b)), and from the general experience of the industry, whether the tax or the increase in other costs was shifted to others. If the Commissioner determines that the difference in average margin was due in part to the tax and in part to the increase in other costs, he shall apportion the change in margin between them;

(2) Proof that the claimant modified existing contracts of sale, or adopted a new form of contract of sale, to reflect the initiation, termination, or change in amount of the processing tax, or at any such time changed the sale price of the article (including the effect of a change in size, package, discount terms, or any other merchandising practice) by substantially the amount of the tax or change therein, or at any time billed the tax as a separate item to any vendee, or indicated by any writing that the sale price included the amount of the tax, or contracted to refund any part of the sale price in the event of recovery of the tax or decision of its invalidity; but the claimant may establish that such acts were caused by factors other than the processing tax, or that they do not represent his practice at other times. If the claimant processed any product in addition to the commodity with respect to the processing of which there was paid or collected an amount as tax for which he claims a refund, and if the Commissioner has reason to believe that the burden of such amount was shifted in whole or in part by means of the transactions relating to such product, the average margin with respect to such product, and articles processed therefrom, shall also be considered, and shall be determined for the tax period applicable to the commodity and for the period before and

after the tax in the manner prescribed in subsection (b) of this section. To the extent the Commissioner determines that the average margin with respect to such product was higher during the tax period than it was during the period before and after the tax, it shall be prima-facie evidence that such amount was not borne by the claimant but that it was shifted to others.

Section 907 (b) (5) Revenue Act of 1936 (49 Stat. 1751)

(5) *Cost of Commodity*.—The cost of commodity processed during each month shall be (a) the actual cost of the commodity processed if the accounting procedure of the claimant is based thereon, or (b) the product computed by multiplying the quantity of the commodity processed by the current prices at the time of processing for commodities of like quality and grade in the markets where the claimant customarily makes his purchases.